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Abstract. The paper analyzes ethnic data collection pertaining to criminal justice in Hungary. 
It shows that Hungary’s approach to resist ethnic data collection by law enforcement 
authorities is not a good policy and it causes severe constitutional problems in other, non-
criminal legal circumstances, where ethnic data is used in the context of additional rights and 
affirmative protection provided for ethno-national minorities. The paper follows a twofold 
analysis. First, it sets forth general problems relating to ethnic data collection, including a brief 
analysis of a uniquely Hungarian constitutional institution, the minority self-government 
structure. The focus of scrutiny then shifts to the criminal justice system, in particular the 
analysis of policing of racially motivated crime, and the question of police ethnic profiling. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper will analyze ethnic data collection pertaining to criminal justice in 
Hungary. In most projects scrutinizing ethnic data collection practices, there is 
always a hidden suggestion that ethnic classification by law enforcement 
authorities inevitably invokes suspicion about ethnic profiling or disparate 
treatment based on ethnic identity. This project will not be an exception to this. 
The paper will show that although Hungary’s approach to resist ethnic data 
collection by law enforcement authorities seems superficially appealing, in 
fact, it is not a good policy. It will be demonstrated that Hungary is one of the 
(many) countries in which extensive legal restrictions on the collection of non-
anonymous data concerning ethnic, national or religious identity have prompted 
law enforcement authorities to simply deny that ethnicity is of significance in 
their actions. This, however, is no guarantee that there are no misuses of police 
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power or that ethnic profiling does not exist. The only effect of such restrictive 
policies is that claims relating to indirect discrimination become enormously 
difficult to prove. The paper will also show that in Hungary, such a restrictive 
approach to ethno-national data classification also causes severe constitutional 
problems in other, non-criminal legal circumstances, where ethnic data is used 
in the context of additional rights and affirmative protection provided for ethno-
national minorities. 
 Traditionally, within Hungary, law enforcement methods based on ethnic 
selection have affected the Roma minority rather than minute other ethnic or 
racial communities. As we shall see, the authorities have virtually unlimited 
discretion when it comes to stops and searches, and as a result, the possibility 
for misuse of power remains unhindered. 
 The paper will therefore follow a twofold analysis. First, it will set forth 
general problems relating to the above described approach to ethnic data 
collection. This will include a brief analysis of some controversies and challenges 
to a uniquely Hungarian constitutional institution, the minority self-govern-
ment structure. The focus of scrutiny then shifts to the criminal justice system, 
about which the paper will show that the denial of ethnic data collection is 
not a good policy. This thesis will be supported by two examples: first, the 
analysis of policing of racially motivated crime, and second, the question of 
police ethnic profiling. In reference to the first question, it will be argued that 
law enforcement agents, as well as prosecutors and courts, are very reluctant to 
recognize racial motivation in violent and non-violent crimes, and will only 
qualify such criminal activity as nuisance, assault or mischief. Following 
this, by turning to a more detailed analysis of ethnic profiling, the paper will 
first describe the actual procedure involved in police ethnic data collection. 
The paper will conclude by restating that prohibiting the official recognition 
and collection of data on ethnicity (that is nevertheless present and taken 
into consideration) by criminal justice authorities is a potentially ethnically 
discriminatory practice. 
 
 
When Is a Minority a Minority? 
 
Target groups 
 
In the Hungarian legal and political jargon the terms “ethnic” and “national” 
minorities (and features) are used instead of “racial”. Although there are 
thirteen recognized ethnic and national minorities in Hungary, racial profiling 
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and racial (ethno-national) conflict predominantly refer to the treatment of a 
single visible minority, the Roma. The number of immigrants and foreigners 
with non-European phenotypes is also increasing in recent years, producing a 
new victim group for racial profiling. Recent immigration however, is still of 
relatively small scale and mainly transitory.2 In fact, immigrants make up only 
about 1,5 percent of the Hungarian population and approximately two third are 
ethnic Hungarians from coming from the neighboring states. 
 Although profiling and discrimination in the criminal justice system may 
exist against Asian, Muslim or other immigrant population, nevertheless, the 
severity of the disparate treatment of the Roma is exponentially greater. Due to 
the legal ambiguity of ethno-national classification (see below), the size of the 
Roma population is hard to establish. Census and academic estimates range 
between 200 000 and 600 000.3  
 
Group affiliation 
 
Data collection aside, ethno-national affiliation in itself is a controversial, 
ardently debated topic in Hungary. Article 68 (1) of the Constitution states: 
national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary participate 
in the sovereign power of the people: they represent a constituent part of the 
State. National and ethnic minorities are specifically protected under the Act 
on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities.4 The Act does not, however, 
define the term ‘ethnic’ or ‘national minority’. As a result of political negotia-
tions, for example Jews are not included among national and ethnic minorities 
for the purposes of the Act, a fact which, however, will not prevent them from 
being covered by the Race Equality Directive5 and general domestic anti-
discrimination legislation.6 
  
 2 2003 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheet–Hungary. http://www.unhcr. 
ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=hun  
 3 Census data is inaccurate because many Roma are reluctant to identify themselves as 
such. Some improvement is noticeable: whereas in the 1991 census 142 683 persons declared 
themselves Roma, in 2001 this number increased to 190 046. Minority organizations put this 
number somewhere between 400 000 and 500 000. The most reliable number was provided 
by a survey in 1993/1994 estimating 456 000. See UNDP Avoiding the Dependency Trap. 
Bratislava 2002 
 4 Act No. 77 of 1993. 
 5 Directive 2000/43 EC, Official Journal of the European Communities 2000, L 180/22. 
 6 Farkas, L.: The Monkey that does not see, Roma Rights Quarterly, 2004. No. 2. 
rhttp://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=1940  
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 The 1993 Act defines national and ethnic minorities as groups which have 
been present in the territory of Hungary for over 100 years and „(§ 1.) constitute 
a numerical minority within the population of the country, whose members hold 
Hungarian citizenship and differ from the rest of the population in terms of their 
own tongue, cultures and traditions, and who prove to be aware of the cohesion, 
national or ethnic, which is to aim at preserving all these and at articulating 
and safeguarding the interests of their respective historically developed commu-
nities.” According to the Act, these minorities are: Bulgarian, Roma (Gypsy), 
Greek, Croat, Polish, German, Armenian, Roman, Ruthenian, Serb, Slovak, 
Slovene, and Ukrainian; and in order to register a new minority group, a popular 
initiative signed by 1000 citizens has to be submitted to the Speaker of the 
Parliament. The Act also provides for the (fundamental) right of self identifi-
cation and lays down specific protections for minorities' members, including 
the prohibition of any policy that “persecutes a national or ethnic minority or 
any of its members because of their national status, makes their living conditions 
more difficult, or prevents them from exercising their rights”. 
 Without going into an in-depth analysis of the Hungarian statutory model, 
two controversies–procedural as well as material–need to be pointed out. Both 
material requirements (100-year presence and 1000 signatures as a special 
popular initiative) for qualifying as an ethnic or national minority seem 
problematic. The Act, besides defining the two group constituting requirements, 
also contains an enumeration of the thirteen minority groups that are recognized 
by the Act, which means that the Parliament will actually need to pass a formal 
amendment to these provisions if a new group would qualify. The House (being 
sovereign) however, is not obliged to vote affirmatively on the question, which 
is in sharp contradiction with the otherwise clearly defined requirements.7  
 Another set of issues concern the question of is who is to verify or question 
whether the 100-year requirement has been fulfilled, and when is the clock 
supposed to start ticking. When will the Chinese minority (a considerable 
population since the political transition) be entitled to seek recognition? What 
about the Palestinians, who may claim some 600 hundred years of presence if 
„Ismaelite” merchants are considered?8  
  
 7 A number of Parliamentary and Constitutional Court decisions have been passed on 
petitions of various ethno-national groups, like the Jews, Aegean Macedons, Russians, the 
Bunyevac, or Huns seeking recognition. 
 8 Both groups have estimated numbers of 10 000. Meanwhile some doubt that certain 
recognized minorities (such as the Ruthenian for example) have fulfilled the statutory 
numerical requirements. (The same doubts were raised on that of the 100-year presence of 
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 As a background note, it is important to stress that post-1989 Hungarian 
minority-politics cannot be understood outside the context of the ethnic 
Hungarian Diaspora. (Following the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 two-third of 
Hungary’s historic territory (with a corresponding population) had been annexed 
to the neighboring state. Since then, but especially after the 1989 political 
transition, Diaspora politics has been a dominant factor in Hungarian foreign 
and domestic politics.) We can even say that besides classical commitments, 
one of the primary reasons behind constitutional motivations for providing and 
recognizing minority rights had been Article 6 (3) of the constitution, which 
declares that “the Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the 
fate of Hungarians living outside its borders and shall promote and foster their 
relations with Hungary.” Commentators9 claim that the creation of the above 
described homogenous legislation for national and ethnic minorities may help 
promoting rights of ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring countries; it cannot, 
however, provide an effective institutional framework to deal with the specific 
and robust Roma-problem. Also, this monolithic minority category is inefficient 
in serving the needs of all thirteen official minority groups in Hungary, which 
substantially differ in size and consequent claims and aspirations. Also, critics 
point out10 that the European accession and subsequent changes in the constitu-
tional and socio-political climate will bring challenges that the anachronistic, 
pre-accession minded Diaspora-targeting law cannot cope with. For example, 
the appearance of European or other migrant workers and immigrants will 
bring challenges that the existing legal framework may not be able to handle. 
Newly arriving groups will easily outnumber small traditional national 
minorities (such as the Armenian and Ruthenian), while the current legal frame-
work does not have clear guidelines as to how new groups can seek official 
recognition.  
 
                                                      
the Greeks.) The legislator is of course free to recognize any group as a national or ethic 
minority (even lacking the general conditions), yet the statutory language setting forth the 
requirements therefore seems absolute and general, and is thus somewhat misleading. 
 9 See for example, Pap A. L.: Minority Rights and Diaspora Claims: Collision and Inter-
dependence. In: The Status Law Syndrome: Post-Communist Nation-Building or Post-Modern 
Citizenship? Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 2005. (forthcoming). 
 10 See for example, Pap A. L.: Csatlakozás és csalatkozás. A kisebbségi törvény módo-
sításának kihívásai és a kormány modellje (Accession and Disillusionment: Challenges Facing 
the Government’s Model for Amending the Act on Ethnic and National Minorities). 
http://www.nfh.hu/index2.htm?p=2&t=2&i=2967 
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Individual affiliation 
 
The other, even more controversial element of the Hungarian framework relates 
to the lack of satisfying legal guarantees regarding individuals’ minority 
affiliation. Hungarian law allows for the handling of data on racial and ethnic 
origin only with the consent of the person concerned.11 This gives rise to what 
is commonly known as “ethno-business” or “ethno-corruption”, that is, the 
utilization and misusage of remedial measures for private means that are contrary 
to the legislators’ intentions. 
 In this model, the exercise of minority rights is not dependent on minimal 
affiliation requirements. For example, Stephen Deets documents how school 
officials pressure parents of ‘Hungarian’ students to declare their children 
‘German’: „according to Hungarian government statistics, in 1998, almost 45 000 
primary school students were enrolled in German-minority programs, which, 
by the latest census, is about 8000 more than the number of ethnic Germans 
who are even in Hungary.”12 
 Hungary also established a relatively potent form of autonomous minority 
institution, the ‘minority self-government’ structure (bodies that co-exist with 
local municipal administration), and the decision to vote at these elections was 
left solely to the political culture and conscience of the majority. Thus, in Hungary, 
citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, could vote for minority self-govern-
ment candidates. This enabled members of the majority to take advantage of 
the various remedial measures. For example, the wife of the mayor of Jász-
ladány–a village notorious for segregating Roma primary school children from 
non-Roma–held an elected office in the local Roma minority self-government. 
Likewise, non-Romani parents can claim that they are Romani in order to conceal 
racial segregation.13  
 Hungarian minority representatives repeatedly claim that the fact that some 
candidates ran as ‘Gypsies’ in one election and then later as Germans in the 
following term (which is permitted by both the law and the ideal of multiple 
  
 11 This of course does not prohibit the anonymous collection of census data. In general, 
Articles 2(2) and 3(2) of Act No. 63 of 1992 on the protection of personal data and the 
publicity of public data (Data protection Act). 
 12 Deets S. Reconsidering East European Minority Policy: Liberal Theory and European 
Norms. East European Politics and Society 16 (2002). 
 13 For a detailed case description see Roma Rights 2003. 107–108. In the summer of 
2003 the Roma Press Center’s fact finding revealed that at one point non-Romani parents 
signed a petition in which they too claimed to be Romani. 
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identity-formation) proves the flourishing of local ethno-business.14 Similarly, 
both the President of the National Romanian Minority Self-Government15 
in Hungary and the (Romanian) Secretary for Romanians Living Outside 
Romania16 found it worrisome that the 2002 local elections brought an increasing 
number of candidates for Romanian minority self governments, while the 
number of those identifying themselves as Romanian in the national census is 
decreasing.17 In their view, the answer lies in the fact that “Gypsies” and 
Hungarian immigrants who moved from Romania are running as Romanians. 
In order to demonstrate the fallacies of the legal framework, some Roma 
politicians publicly decided to run under different labels (in most of the reported 
17 cases, Slovakian). Also, there are several municipalities where (according 
to the national census) nobody identified herself as a member of any minority 
group, yet numerous minority candidates were registered.18  
 Though there are no exact data on the number of minorities of Hungary, 
based on the number of votes cast at minority–self-government elections it can 
be safely claimed that a significant number of citizens, who are not members 
of any minority, voted for minority candidates.19 (At the 2001 census, 139 763 
persons, that is 1,37% of the population, claimed to have a minority language as 
their mother tongue–the census made it possible for everyone to mark maximum 
three languages. Three answers could be given concerning nationality affiliation 
as well–318 391 persons acknowledged belonging to some minority, consti-
tuting 3,12% of the population. In light of this evidence, it is interesting to note 
that 1 777 299 person in the first election in 1990 and 2 657 722 persons in the 
second one in 1994 cast their vote for some minority candidate.)  
  
 14 See the minority-ombudsman's annual parliamentary reports or an interview with 
Antal Heizler, President of the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, Népszabadság 
(the leading Hungarian daily), 2002. 07. 24. 
 15 The President did not predict that more then 7 out of the 17 local self-governments 
running in the 2002 elections in Budapest (and some 30 out of the 48 registered nationally) 
would be “authentic Romanian”. Out of the 13 local Romanian minority self-governments 
operating between 1998 and 2002, he estimated that only three have “real Romanian 
blood” running in their veins. See the summary of an interview with Kreszta Trajan, 
Népszabadság, 2002. 08. 21. 
 16 See the statement of Doru Vasile Ionescu in Népszabadság, 2002. 08. 15. 
 17 Only five signatures are needed for the registration of a minority self-government. 
(For which subsequently everybody, including members of the 'majority', may vote.) 
 18 See Népszabadság, 2002. 08. 15. 
 19 Majtényi, B.: Minority Rights in Hungary and the Situation of the Roma. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 45  (2004) 131–148. 
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 The examples of loopholes in the legal regime sometimes result in complete 
absurdity. In order to express their admiration of German football for example, 
a small village's entire football-team registered as German minority-candidates 
for the elections.20 
 It should also be noted that the question of ethno-national identity has been 
the focus of other socio-political debates, such as the Hungarian status law, a 
framework legislation that provides for schemes of rights and preferences 
available for ethnic Hungarians living in Diaspora. During the drafting of this 
law,21 an ardent domestic political debate22 arose from the various legislative 
approaches in identifying who would be considered Hungarian (for the purposes 
of the law.) In fact, the contradiction between the basic liberal tenet of the free 
choice of identity and the desire to reduce (the legal) options for both politically 
and financially undesirable misusage was perhaps the most controversial 
aspect of the law.  
 In June 2005 the Hungarian Parliament passed23 a comprehensive amend-
ment to the Minorities Act. The legislation made it a point to set forth a plan 
for institutional reorganization of the minority-protection mechanisms. At the 
same time, combating the aforementioned ethno-corruption, it introduced a 
somewhat controversial registration procedure for those who decide to take 
advantage of the various privileges and additional rights set forth by the 
minority law. In order to ensure that only members of the given minority can 
vote and be elected to minority self-government, the law redefines the meaning 
of Article 68. par. (4) of the Hungarian Constitution which stipulates that 
national and ethnic minorities have the right to establish minority self-govern-
ments. The Act thus departs from the preexisting dedication to the free choice 
  
 20 Interview with Mr. Heizler, Id. 
 21 Act 67 of 2001. 
 22 Two of the three opposition parties in parliament have severely criticized the text, 
claiming first of all that the government is significantly underestimating the cost of the 
law. The Socialist party estimated that as many as one million people would be taking 
advantage of the health care benefit, which alone could cost around 15 billion Forints ($50 
million), and the annual price of the proposed legislation would actually add up to around 
60 billion Forints. Additional concerns were raised regarding the labor market’s capacity to 
deal with the estimated additional 700 000 legal laborers. Opposition liberals expressed 
grave misgivings about the overall conception behind the law, claiming that the intricate 
web of preferences and benefits (most of which would be available in Hungary) does not 
support staying but in fact encourages immigration. 
 23 The President vetoed the legislation and the Constitutional Court struck down some 
of its provisions. 
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of identity and by eliminating the explicit provision allowing for the recognition 
of multiple identity, sets forth legal requirements for minority political 
participation. According to the new legislation,24 both the right to vote for and 
to run as candidates at the minority elections would require the registration.25 
The first minority self-government elections under the new regulations will be 
held in autumn 2006. 
 Having described general issues relating to ethno-national identity, let us 
now turn to the question of ethnic data collection. 
 
 
Ethnicity and Data Collection 
 
As mentioned previously, data protection laws in Hungary, in particular 
Articles 2(2) and 3(2) of Act No. 63 of 1992 prohibit the handling of sensitive 
data, such as ethnic origin, without the concerned person’s explicit permission.  
Sometimes practice in this area appears to be quite illogical. For example, 
officials claim that the recording of racial violence victims would run against 
statutory provisions, even though the Criminal Code acknowledges certain 
racially motivated crimes,26 such as “violence against members of national, 
ethnic or racial minorities and religious groups” or “incitement against 
community”, all of which presuppose membership in the given (racially or 
ethno-nationally defined) community. Although on the national level, the 
existence of such statistics is mostly denied, ethnic data is collected by many 
institutions–for administering minority self government elections, affirmative 
action quotas, minority scholarships, etc.27 For some procedures set forth by 
the Minorities Act (seeking minority self-government elections or minority 
language education, registering first names that are not included in the official 
Hungarian register, etc.) one needs to make a formal declaration regarding 
ethno-national affiliation in order to be eligible for the measures or preferences.  
  
 24 Act CXIV. of  2005. 
 25 See for example Minelres News, Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, Buda-
pest, Hungary, Selection of news on national and ethnic minorities in Hungary, March 2004, 
http://lists.delfi.lv/pipermail/minelres/2004-March/date.html. 
 26 The Hungarian Criminal Code (Act IV. of 1978) criminalizes four types of behavior 
that may fall under the racially motivated category. These are: genocide (Article 155), 
apartheid (Article 157), violence against members of national, ethnic or racial minorities 
and religious groups (Article 174/B) and incitement against community (Article 269). 
 27 For more, see Farkas: op. cit. 
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 It should also be stressed that the anonymous collection of data relating to 
one’s perceived ethnic origin for research purposes is not explicitly prohibited 
by the Data Protection Act, since it defines sensitive data as one that relates to 
racial origin, national and ethnic minority affiliation–not perceived racial origin. 
For example, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee’s research into discrimination 
against Roma defendants in the criminal justice system (see below) was too 
based on perceived ethnic origin. 
 This leads us to the central question within ethno-national data collection 
(and similarly, within racial profiling and discrimination): whether group identity 
should be based on self-identification, or on perception.28 As Lilla Farkas 
(2004)29 claims, 
 
“Perceived ethnic origin and self-identity are rather different notions, the 
former being an objective category, and the latter a subjective one. Neither 
can be established with indisputable certainty, as there will always be, for 
example, Roma who bear less visible signs of their ethnicity. On the same 
token, persons identified by the majority as being Roma may deny affiliation 
with this ethnic group on account of having lost cultural and language links 
with the group..” 
 
Curiously, the case law pertaining to penalizing ‘violence against a member of 
an ethnic group’,30 suggests that Hungarian criminal law recognizes the difference 
between self-identification and perceived ethnic origin and attaches the same 
criminal liability to violence committed on either ground. As Hungarian judges 
seem to understand now, a plaintiff who does not profess herself in court as 
belonging to the Romani minority, can at the same time claim that he was 
discriminated on the ground of her perceived ethnic origin. It is in fact the 
perception of Romani ethnicity and not self-identification that establishes the 
ground of discrimination.31 
 In general, as Farkas (2004) points out, with Hungarian law allowing for 
the handling of data on racial and ethnic origin only with the consent of the 
person concerned, the effect is a severe impediment on the prospect of litigation 
  
 28 Two major camps fight in social sciences, those in favor of self-identity, such as 
János Ladányi and those in favor of perception, such as Gábor Havas, István Kemény and 
Gábor Kertesi. Farkas: op. cit. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Article 174/B of Act 4 of 1978 on the Criminal Code. 
 31 See Farkas: op. cit. 
 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND ETHNIC DATA COLLECTION IN HUNGARY    
  
 
167
against indirect discrimination or institutional racism.32 Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, the law gave rise to what is commonly known as “ethno-
business” or “ethno-corruption”, especially in relation to participation in minority 
elections and election of minority self-governments. Finally, the law diminishes 
hopes to devise or implement positive action programs. As the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) reported in 1999: “while 
acknowledging the fact that the collection and utilization of data on ethnic 
origin is restricted in Hungary for valid reasons, ECRI is concerned that the 
lack of reliable information about the situation of various minority groups 
living in the country makes evaluation of the extent of possible discrimination 
against them or the effect of the actions intended to fight such discrimination 
difficult.”33 
 The two aforementioned Acts (on minority rights and data protection) 
created two specialized Commissioners to insure that data protection, infor-
mational privacy and access to public data, as well as minorities’ rights are 
respected. The two ombudsmen play a crucial role in framing a workable racial 
profiling policy and safeguarding the handling of ethnicity-related data. 
 
 
Criminal Justice and Ethnic Data 
 
Having demonstrated the controversial nature of the Hungarian legislative 
approach to ethnic data collection in general, in the following sections, the 
paper will scrutinize its consequences with respect to criminal justice. Criminal 
investigation and law enforcement practices provide another source of evidence 
for proving that the denial to recognize ethnicity in a system which never-
theless (formally, or informally) takes it into consideration is not a good policy. 
This thesis will be supported by two examples: first, the analysis of policing 
and indicting racially motivated crime, and second, the question of police ethnic 
profiling. In reference to the first question, the paper will argue that law 
  
 32 Under Article 19(1) b, of Act No. 125 of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion 
of equal opportunities the plaintiff must establish his ethnic origin in order for the burden 
of proof to be reversed. In any case, under Article 8 protection is based on ethnicity, thus 
he must clear this issue when bringing a case. In cases of indirect discrimination not only 
the ethnicity of the plaintiff(s) but also of the comparator(s) must be established. The latter 
may prove an insurmountable task. 
 33 Second report on Hungary, Adopted on 18 June 1999 made public on 21 March 
2000, Para. 26. http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/Ecri/5-Archives/1-ECRI's_work/5-
CBC_Second_reports/Hungary_CBC_2.asp 
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enforcement agents, as well as prosecutors and courts, are very reluctant to 
recognize racial motivation in violent and non-violent crimes.  
 
Ethnic data and race crimes  
 
Notwithstanding the sweetest sounding constitutional and statutory languages 
on equal treatment, free choice of identity and the protection of sensitive 
data, it is always the discriminatory practice of the majority that will actually 
provide a practical definition for ethnic affiliation. Thus when it comes to 
the maltreatment of members of various ethnic groups, no difficulties in 
definitions arises for the discriminating party. Such conceptual ambiguities 
will only worsen the protections provided for the victimized group. Consider 
for example the case of racially motivated crimes. 
 The Hungarian Criminal Code (Act IV. of 1978) criminalizes four types of 
behavior that may fall under the racially motivated category. (Racial motivation 
is implied in the wording of the law.) These are: genocide (Article 155), 
apartheid (Article 157), violence against members of national, ethnic or racial 
minorities and religious groups (Article 174/B) and incitement against 
community (Article 269). Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the first two never, 
and the latter two only very rarely occur in official statistics.  
For example, in the past five years, no investigation was initiated in relation 
of apartheid or genocide, whereas the statistics for Article 269 and 174/B are as 
follows:34 
 
Table 1. shows the statistics for investigations and charges brought under 
“violence against a member of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group” 
(Penal Code, Article 174/B) offences. 
 
year 
 
cases 
identified 
offenders 
identified 
charges 
brought 
2001 12 9 9 
2002 5 5 5 
2003 11 9 8 
2004 7 6 5 
2005 7 3 2 
 
  
 34 Information provided by Chief Prosecutor’s Office to the Hungarian NFP. 
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Table 2. shows the statistics for investigations and charges brought under 
”incitement against community” (Penal Code Article 269) offences.  
 
year 
 
cases 
identified 
offenders 
identified 
charges 
brought 
2000 5 1 1 
2001 10 12 11 
2002 13 11 11 
2003 14 11 11 
2004 17 1 1 
2005 4 1 1 
 
 This should by no means imply that racial crimes and violence are non-
existent in Hungary, but rather that law enforcement agents, as well as prosecu-
tors and courts, are very reluctant to recognize racial motivation in violent 
and non-violent crimes committed against Roma and other minority victims. 
Although officers and officials habitually claim that it is because of the lack 
of clear legislative guidelines for the establishment of racial motivation that 
most of such instances will only qualify as nuisance, assault or mischief. On 
the other hand, many politicians and experts argue that criminal legislation in 
force could easily allow for a less narrow, more minority-friendly interpretation. 
 In Hungary, in line with the legally articulated declaration to refrain from 
any kind of involuntary official classification of ethnicity, no specific legally 
binding instructions exist for the determination of racially motivated criminal 
activity. Thus, law enforcement officers, who are the prime decision-makers as 
to the legal classification of a given offense will follow the easier way, and 
become very reluctant to classify incidents, conflicts as racially motivated. 
Although it will always be the law-school-graduate prosecutor who will decide 
on what grounds to indict the defendant, she will usually follow the police’s 
determination on the nature of the criminal offense in question. As for the 
police, officers claim that in determining whether an offense is racially 
motivated, they take notice of an internal guidance issued by the Attorney 
General that directs prosecutors when considering and qualifying the 
indictment. This means that the only legal guidance is an internal policy guide, 
which, needless to say, would not stand very strong against constitutional 
challenges. The outcome is clear: in order to avoid making an uncomfortable 
and (given the widespread anti-Roma or xenophobic sentiments in Hungarian 
society) unpopular decision, and lacking any legally binding guidance, we 
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see a very strong reluctance to recognize racial motivation in violent criminal 
behavior.  
 As noted above, this practice also seems quite illogical at times, for example 
in the case of race crime victims. Referring to data protection regulations, official 
statistics have no reliable data on the ethnicity of race crime victims, either, 
which is entirely absurd, given that the existence of racially motivated crimes 
logically presupposes membership in the given (racially or ethno-nationally 
defined) community. Other evidence for demonstrating that such a narrow 
interpretation of a facially minority-friendly principle is actually contrary to the 
victimized groups’ interest, is that the above mentioned criminal statistics 
operate with a homogenous victim category, and statistics will not contain 
figures broken up into the various protected categories (racial, national, ethnic, 
religious groups). This will make it very difficult for minority representatives 
or advocacy groups to demonstrate their case. 
 
 
Police Profiling and Ethnic Data 
 
In this section, the paper turns to the assessment of ethnic profiling in police 
work. Scrutiny of ethnic bias in policing and criminal justice should ideally 
include all of the following: stops and searches, detaining, arrest, criminal 
procedure, charging, sentencing, disparity in police brutality, access to counsel, 
law enforcement public employment, ineffective legal remedies, expulsion and 
immigrant treatment. Due to spatial limitations, the analysis of all these issues 
is not possible in this article. Consequently, this last part will only cover ethno-
national data processing in police stop and search, and within that framework, 
vehicle stop and search procedures in particular. The paper’s aim is to provide 
an overview of what type of ethno-national (racial) data is and may be 
collected in Hungary, how and where it is stored, and who has access to it.  
 This section is based on a field research that was commissioned in 2004 by 
the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the Open Society Justice Initiative.35 
The research is part of a comparative study that involves a number of countries 
and focuses on ‘Addressing Racial Profiling and Discrimination in Policing’.  
 
  
 35 See http://www.justiceinitiative.org 
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Stop and search powers 
 
According to the Hungarian legal framework, the police may stop anyone at 
any time and ask questions it deems necessary.36 The vacuous language of 
Article 29 of the Act on Police37 gives full authorization for the police to stop 
and ask for identification ‘anyone, whose identity needs to be established.’ If 
need comes, because the individual is not willing to cooperate or her identity 
cannot be sufficiently established, she may be searched,38 can be arrested39 and 
be held for eight hours, which, if the process has not been successful, can be 
prolonged for an additional four hours by the chief of the local police unit. 
Should this (maximum 12 hour) arrest not be sufficient, another type of 
detention40 (“public order detention”) may be ordered, which (including the 
time spent in arrest) may take as long as twenty-four hours. For these stop and 
search procedures no suspicion whatsoever is needed, no probable cause 
standards are set forth and unsuccessful identification itself may lead to up to 
24 hours of detention. Apart from arrests or detentions, the police are under 
no obligation to provide an explanation–the only exception being when the 
individual herself requests such information.41 The Constitutional Court ruled 
on several challenges to these provisions,42 and has been consistently dismissing 
petitioners’ claims, despite dissents pointing to the disproportionate length of 
the detention and the lack of motivation for speedy police procedures involving 
detainees who are being held without having committed anything illegal. 
 Another form of stop and search competences comes up in the context of 
vehicle control. According to Article 44 of the Police Act, the police may at 
any time check the legality of vehicle operation and possession. The police may 
therefore randomly stop and check vehicle ownership documents, certificates 
for appropriate carbon-dioxide emission, motorway passes, they may check the 
first-aid kit (a required accessory for all vehicles), the insurance contract 
leaflet of the vehicle, or the condition of the windshield wiper. Critics43 have 
  
 36 Article 32. of the Police Act. 
 37 Act 34. of 1994. 
 38 Article 29. 
 39 Article 33. 
 40 Article 38. 
 41 Articles 29 and 33. 
 42 Decisions No. 9/2004. and 65/2003. 
 43 See for example, Pap, A. L.: “Street Police Corruption–A Post-communist State of 
the Art”, Kokkalis Program on Southeastern and East-Central Europe, Kennedy School of 
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argued that it raises constitutional concerns that a significant part of this type 
of control is actually of an administrative nature and should not be performed 
by the police forces. For instance, in the case of a company car, checking the 
authorization from the manager is not a matter of policing per se, but serves 
social security, tax, and administrative purposes instead.  
 Police competences raise another problematic point: the issue of reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause standards. According to the Act on Criminal 
Procedure44 probable cause is needed for the initiation a criminal procedure; 
still, an arrest or the above mentioned “public order detention” does not qualify 
as such. As a result, apart from failure of proper identification, a “simple” 
suspicion (the probability of criminal offence does not exceed 50 percent) also 
suffices for these coercive measures.45 Although the legislator never cared to 
explain what these standards are supposed to mean, the Constitutional Court 
upheld the law,46 precisely on the ground that these measures do not amount to 
criminal procedure and the detained (whose cooperation is crucial in these 
procedures) does not qualify as a defendant under criminal procedures. 
 
Data processing47 
 
Turning to the question of actual data processing, based to the field work that 
had been carried under the auspices of the above mentioned research project, 
it may be established that police data collection and reporting is done on two 
levels: paper forms filled out on the spot and the Robocop 2000, an integrated 
computerized system that is only accessible in the police office. Apart from 
                                                      
Government, Harvard University, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW3/Andras_ 
Laszo.pdf 
 44 Act 19 of 1998. 
 45 Article 33. 
 46 Decision no. 65/2003. 
 47 This subsection is based on informal interviews and consultations with the follow-
ing: Captain Tibor Jármy, Ministry of Interior; Szilveszter Póczik, Senior Associate, 
OKRI, National Institute of Criminology; István Vavró, Department Head, Ministry of 
Justice; Ferencné Horváth, Attorney General’s Office; Klára Csányi, Department Head, 
Ministry of Interior; István Lóczy, Department Head, Ministry of Interior; Major Szabolcs 
Szovics, Budapest Police; Captain László Inárcsi, Department Head, Mezokovesd Police; 
Captain Nagy Zsolt, Department Head, Sátoraljaújhely Police; Liutenant Colonel Zoltán 
Klima, Department Head, National Police; Gábor Tarján, Associate Professor, Police 
Academy, Budapest; Colonel Mihály Szabó, Director, National Police; Colonel Tivadar 
Dormán, Department Head, National Police; Major Eva Ecet, Ministry of Interior. 
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sporadic usage of computerized vehicle recognition systems (by mostly 
specialized units) in-car computers or other handheld computer devices are 
unknown to Hungarian police officers, thus communication mostly is done via 
radio with the dispatcher.48 
The first type of data gathering is done on the spot, during stops and 
searches. In theory, officers would have to report and register every performed 
activity, regardless of whether they will actually initiate any further criminal or 
other procedures. The somewhat dubious language of Article 32 of the Internal 
Minister’s Decree on Police Conduct49 sets forth that the police officer has to fill 
out a registration form (a so called “RK” form–none of the interviewed officers 
knew what the abbreviation stood for) in case of identifying someone, and also 
if further procedures or other circumstances deem it necessary. Data gathering 
thus may be extended to other people, such as passengers of the vehicle. 
Presumably, the mandatory registration of all police stops and activities serves 
internal activity-reporting purposes. From the informal interviews I made, I 
gathered that (although not always) in most cases, the forms are filled out even 
in case nothing extraordinary or illegal has been detected.  
 The form, filled out on the spot by the officer, contains the following data: 
name; date of birth; mother’s maiden name; address; ID card number, expiration 
date; place, time and reason of stopping; description of the activity that the 
police action follows; name, rank of the officer. In case of vehicle control: 
license plate number, type of vehicle, vehicle registration document number, 
expiration date, owner’s name, address. If offenders are being fined on the spot, 
there is no need to fill out the form, penalty-documentations suffice. The actual 
form is somewhat anachronistic, bearing a strong reminiscence to communist 
totalitarianism; it contains several questions that are no longer being asked, 
such as marital status, number of children, workplace, monthly salary. 
 The second type of data processing takes the form of a national computerized 
database, the integrated Robocop50 (Robotzsaru) 2000. According to a National 
Police Chief’s Order,51 all relevant data in criminal proceedings need to be 
  
 48 Interestingly, the data protection ombudsman expressed concerns about the trans-
mitting of sensitive, personal data via the radio, because it sometimes enables unwarranted 
bystanders to overhear information that should not be disclosed. Therefore the police 
promised to take due care of the situation… 
 49 3/1995 (III.1.) BM rendelet (Decree of the Internal Minister). 
 50 The program actually bears an image from the 1987 motion picture Robocop. 
 51 Orders of the Chief of the National Police (Orfk intézkedés) 22/2000 (XII 29) and 
1/2003 (II. 12). 
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registered in the database. In Article 5/b, the relevant data category is defined 
to include all data pertaining to stops, searches, arrests, reports, complaints and 
denunciations. This means that all data registered in the “RK” forms will be 
entered into the Robocop and the forms will be destroyed. 
 As mentioned above, no police registry contains any ethno-national or 
racial data per se. In official use, such as press releases for example, even 
if the victim or a witness would claim that the offender was, say, Roma, the 
formal suspect description will not use any ethno-national signifiers. The over-
whelming majority of police officers I informally interviewed claimed that 
there is no ethnic data at all in any of the police registries. The commissioned 
research however proves this to be not entirely the case. There are two ways 
ethno-national or racial data may be processed in police documents: within 
testimonies by victim defendant or witness, and in the aforementioned Robocop 
informational network. Curiously, while most high-ranking ministerial officials 
denied it, field officers and detectives admitted that in case the victim, a witness, 
or the offender/defendant in his/her testimony or report will claim someone to 
be, say, Roma, and if they insist on this statement to appear in the records, 
such data will be a registered and filed as part of the case documentation (and 
similarly to all important statements, will be attached to the case-file and 
entered into the Robocop.) 
 Therefore if the victim were to state that the offender was “presumably 
Roma”, it would actually be part of the case files. Some officials were of the 
opinion that this would only be the case if the person herself had claimed that 
she was a member of the minority. It has been the researchers’ overall opinion 
that, although in informal communication anti-Roma racism is almost universal 
within the force, officers are quite uncomfortable using ethno-racial classifi-
cation in any form of formal communication, be it verbal (such as orders given 
by the superiors) or written and (out of fear from political attacks) will tiptoe 
around it and use a (presumably) politically correct meta-language instead. In 
sum, officers are unlikely to ask direct questions pertaining to ethnicity, and as 
far as the records are concerned, may even try to persuade witnesses and 
victims to avoid using, say, the term ‘Roma’.  
 The other way ethno-racial data may appear in police registries is even 
more intriguing. The aforementioned Robocop is not only an integrated database, 
but it is also the basis for a unified police-prosecutorial statistical database. 
This is a DOS-based computer program where all information is being stored. 
Most of the data is entered through a code-system, thus the officers and the 
detectives are only selecting among pre-established options. The registry has 
chapters on the offense and the offender. The database provides a thorough 
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analysis of the case and the suspects/defendants and also has a detailed listing 
of causal factors which are divided into “objective” and “subjective” ones.52 
“Objective factors” would include “covering for other criminal offenses”, 
“problems in the family or school”, “low income”, “dropping out from school”, 
“alcoholic or criminal family background”, etc. “Subjective factors” may include 
“lack of driving experience”, “tiredness”, “emotional distress”, “criminal past”, 
“bad influence from peers”, “antisocial attitudes” and somewhat anachronistic 
concepts like “bad media influence”, “selfishness” or “seize the day-attitude”.53 
 The database has a similarly detailed method for describing the appearance 
of the suspect/defendant. In the codebook we find a set of personal charac-
teristics like the form and size of the ears and the teeth, “hollow cheeks”, 
“raspy voice”, “tattoos”, “meeting eyebrows”, “deformity and maiming”. Among 
these identifiers I came across two types that contained ethno-racial references. 
The first type I found among the set of options provided for describing facial skin 
and complexion (among others like “blotchy or pockmarked face”): “Roma-
looking”, “Creole”, and “Arabic, Negro,54 Asian” (sic). Also, among the options 
provided for “accents or dialects” I found the following categories: “with a 
Roma accent” “wailing (sic) like a Roma”.55  
 These ethno-racial classifications are made by the officer/detective, thus in 
the overwhelming majority of cases, the classification is not based on self-
identification, but on an outsider’s perception. Ironically, one of the officers I 
interviewed said that he would actually let the defendant/suspect decide how 
she would be categorized: ‘Roma’ or ‘Creole’. As mentioned above, all these 
factors are listed and the officer can only choose from the pre-established 
options and will only type in the appropriate code number. It is important to 
point out that the officers do not have to fill out all the questions; it is entirely 
up to their discretion. Furthermore, at the end of each section, there is an 
“other” category, where (unlike the previous ones) the officer can type in 
whatever she may consider relevant. In theory, this could even include victims’ 
or witnesses’ statement regarding the offender’s ethnicity. In general, it is safe 
  
 52 Section 39 of the database is now eliminated; it used to contain the explicit question 
whether or not the defendant/suspect is Roma. 
 53 Officers are very reluctant to find a crime to be racially motivated, even though they 
could do so (see above). 
 54 In the Hungarian socio-linguistic context the term “Negro” is not necessarily 
pejorative. (Legislators, drafters and webmasters of such a database on the other hand 
should have been aware of the international context…) 
 55 In Hungarian: “cigányosan sápítozva”. 
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to say, that such a scenario is quite unlikely – partly due to the aforementioned 
uneasiness about dealing with ethno-racial data in official communications 
and also in part because of the fact that this would mean additional work. As I 
gathered from the interviews, officers do not like to waste their time thoroughly 
filling out the causal factors section. Access to data depends on the status and 
position of the officers, as well as their standing (level and degree of involve-
ment) in the procedure. One may have the impression, that it is only due to the 
lack of sophistication of the IT-system that ethno-national data is not easily 
accessible or connected to other data. 
 
Data processing and ethnic profiling 
 
Intriguing as findings within the previous section were, the consequences are 
dubious. As we have seen, data processing is hardly existent in the procedures 
of the Hungarian police. It would however be an incorrect conclusion to draw 
that consequently no ethnic profiling or discrimination exists in the criminal 
justice system. In fact, academic estimates and NGO reports suggest the 
contrary. Since 1994, maltreatment of the Roma has been widely documented 
by human rights NGOs such as the Legal Defence Bureau for National and 
Ethnic Minorities (NEKI), the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) and the 
Romani Civil Rights Foundation (RPA). The Parliamentary Commissioner for 
National and Ethnic Minorities has on numerous occasions called attention to 
discriminatory police actions towards the Roma.56  
 In 2002–2003, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee carried out research on 
discrimination against Roma in the criminal justice system, finding deep-
running traces of racial profiling by the police within Roma communities. By 
scrutinizing court files, the research focused on how perpetrators were initially 
detected by the authorities. The findings of the survey appeared to be fully in 
line with similar Anglo-American studies that analyze discrimination in the 
criminal justice procedure against visible minorities. The researchers found that 
Roma offenders and suspects were significantly more likely to have been 
  
 56 For example, in his 2000 report the Minorities Commissioner observed that the high 
level of discretion allowed in actions such as house searches may easily allow for ethnic 
discrimination. In 1999, he reported a complaint filed by a teacher who alleged that his 
Roma students were discriminated in the course of a stop for ID checks. 2004 saw the first 
victory of the Hungarian human rights movement engaged in defense of Roma rights 
before the European Court of Human Rights. For the first time since Hungary ratified the 
Convention, in the Balogh judgment, the Court found a violation of Article 3. 
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identified via police stops and searches, whereas in the case of non-minority 
suspects, other investigatory methods–particularly being caught in the act–
were the dominant causes that lead to the suspects’ capture.57 
 Another empirical comparative research,58 conducted on behalf of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) between 2005 and 2006 indicated that in Hungary 
the Roma are discriminated against in the context of stops and searches by 
the police, especially in the practice of stopping pedestrians.59 There is strong 
statistical evidence that Roma are subject to pedestrian stops more often than 
non-Roma.60 
 Circumstantial evidence from other stages of the criminal procedure also 
indicates the likeliness of ethnic profiling. According to the 2001 EUMAP 
report61 “research indicates that Roma are more likely than non-Roma to be 
reprimanded in pre-trial detention or ill-treated by the police,62 and tend not to 
have legal representation during investigation”. ECRI has expressed concern 
  
 57 See Farkas: op. cit. 
 58 See Pap, A. L.–Simonovits, B.–Balogi, A.–Vargha, L.: Research Report for Hungary, 
Results from the research project “A Comparative Study of Stop and Search Practices in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain”, Budapest, 2006. 
 59 The research was aimed at examining stop and search procedures by the police. In 
Hungary, the empirical data collection had four parts: A questionnaire-based public 
opinion poll targeting a representative group within the Hungarian population; a total of six 
focus group discussions in Budapest, Miskolc and Pécs, with people–Roma as well as non-
Roma–who have experienced stop and search; a total of 20 community interviews in Buda-
pest, Miskolc and Pécs, with people–Roma as well as non-Roma–who have experienced 
stop and search and  a total of 80 interviews in Budapest, Miskolc and Pécs, with officers 
who conduct stop and search. 
 60 The research results are based on a survey series conducted during September, 2005 
which shows that over the past year, 23% of the Hungarian adult population was stopped 
by the police. Among the Roma respondents 57 percent were stopped as pedestrians, at 
entertainment venues or some sort of event (a concert, say). By contrast, among non-Roma 
respondents only 22 percent were stopped at such locations.. 
 61 EUMAP Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection. OSI EU 
Accession Monitoring Program 2001. 241. 
 62 Hungarian Helsinki Committee and OSI-COLPI, Punished Before Sentence, Buda-
pest, 1997. See also UN Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and recommendations 
concerning Hungary ’s third periodic report, November 1998: “The Committee is also 
concerned about the persistent reports that [...]a disproportionate number of detainees 
and/or prisoners serving their sentences are Roma.” 
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“at evidence that severe problems in the administration of justice exist as regards 
discrimination against members of the Roma/Gypsy community [...]”.63 
 
Policing and minority-awareness 
 
In general, racial (ethno-national) awareness in policing is not identified in the 
context of minority victimization, but rather as a task to reduce Roma-associated 
criminality. At best, the context of racial (ethno-national) awareness is focused 
on cultural conflict and equal protection rather than ‘race crime. In other 
words, the important issue in the eyes of police leadership is how to prepare 
the police force for dealing with the higher criminality rate and cultural 
specificity of the Roma minority. To put it bluntly, ethnicity is dominantly 
seen as a problem arising in connection with the offenders and not the victims. 
Nevertheless, police training encompasses racism in general and racism as a 
specialized police issue. Anti-discrimination and conflict resolution courses 
and training are thus incorporated into all levels of police education, which, 
since 1999 also includes courses in Roma (cultural) studies. We also see a 
number of special programs promoting Roma presence within the force. There 
are some (mostly unsuccessful) recruiting programs for the police in Roma 
high schools, and a number of affirmative action provisions are available for 
Roma working in the police force. The police also developed nationwide scholar-
ship programs as well as Police Academy entrance examination preparation 
programs for prospective Roma students.  
 The police also have a reasonably well developed network of cooperation 
with NGOs and minority organizations. Human rights organizations operate 
legal clinics and legal aid programs, and the police organize and participate in 
training programs in affiliation with civil organizations. Following a 1999 
formal agreement between the National Roma Minority Self Government and 
the National Police, formal and informal connections have been established 
between local, regional and national level police and Roma minority self 
governments.  
 A network of outreach officers and specialized liaisons operate at all levels 
of police administration, and police leadership annually monitors these 
networks. Outreach officers and Roma policy-coordinators organize training, 
crime prevention forums, and sports events (i.e. Roma-Police football games). 
Although minority self governments are active partners at the level of official 
declarations, commentators claim that in terms of practical co-operation or 
  
 63 ECRI (2000) 5, para. 14. 
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conflict-resolution, these political bodies are not always fully capable of 
“representing” the community. In terms of actual policing practice, there are 
no racial profiling policies per se, but there is an official commitment on behalf of 
police leadership for providing strict scrutiny to all reports regarding anti-
Roma discrimination within the force. The Chief of the national police receives 
an annual report on these cases.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The foregoing has been an attempt to show one aspect of the legal and social 
context (the long-standing challenges and sensitivities) of ethnic data generation 
and collection. It is my conviction that the core question in the Hungarian saga 
of ethnic profiling and ill-treatment in criminal justice lies in determining 
under what conditions and with what kind of (external or self-identified) 
definitions the legal framework should operate. In other words, what serves the 
minority’s interests? 
 Two contradicting conclusions can be drawn: a modest and a daring one. 
As for the first, we may confidently state that the Hungarian legislator did not 
err in providing a narrow framework for ethnic data processing, as whatever 
the reasons for ethnic profiling and police ill-treatment may be, it is certainly 
not related to ethno-national data collection. The second conclusion may be 
that it is (at least partly) due to the lack of applicable tools for measurement 
that ethnic discrimination may flourish. In other words, maybe it is also due to 
the superficially satisfying legislative framework for ethnic data collection that 
indirect and direct discrimination in policing can exist.  
 The question is far from easy to answer. In fact, it leads us to perplexing 
long-unresolved dilemmas. The establishment and practical application of 
legal definitions to complex and abstract human behavioral phenomena is a 
fundamental and crucial point in the legal hermeneutic process. It is important 
to note that many legal concepts–such as life or family–are by nature ambiguous; 
yet when there is legislative and legal interest in providing (legally compre-
hensible) definitions the legal system is always successful in the creation of 
some form of conceptualizing. We therefore find workable legal definitions for 
such complex and otherwise controversial concepts as the beginning of life, or 
the life of the fetus in relation of inheriting, or family for tax, and civil legal 
purposes. 
 The peculiarity of legal conceptualizing lies in the fact that seemingly 
neutral legal concepts can easily be instruments of social conflict and tools for 
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discrimination. For example, a narrow definition of physical disability or mental 
retardation (phrased in the value-neutral language of medicine) can seriously 
limit the scope of application of equal opportunity or affirmative action 
measures,64 excluding thereby certain groups from its application.65 Similarly, 
throughout the world, one of the terrains of homosexual anti-discrimination 
legislative lobbying is to loosen up the generic (civil) legal concept of marriage to 
include same sex partnerships. (Attempts are made at widening the traditional 
legal marriage-definition, which conceptually requires members to be of the 
opposite sex.) Ethnic and racial identities are textbook examples for collective 
representations of socially constructed particular communities. In traditional 
societies, socially relevant identities (such as class) are usually rigid and 
unchangeable; it was not until post-feudal, modern, open societies, that there 
was room left for the individual’s free choice of identity and redefined strategic 
behavior. In fact (at least in theory), in contemporary open societies the denial 
of free choice of identity equals the non-recognition of the individual as a 
source of constitutionally protected value, constituting a violation of human 
dignity.66 
 There are, however, numerous theoretical and practical problems regarding 
the legal-administrative assessment of ethnic identification. The first inherent 
contradiction is that while it is membership in an ethnic or racial group that 
serves as a basis for constitutional protection, it is always the individual who is 
to be entitled to the special legal regime, benefits or preferential treatment. The 
practical consequence of administrative-legal attempts to resolve this situation 
is that the individual’s group affiliation is defined either too loosely and 
ambiguously, or too rigidly. Legislators and the courts are facing at least two 
types of serious and inherent problems when dealing with affiliation-issues. 
 The first practical problem of “ethnic cheating” arises in the context of 
ethnic-racial affiliation being too liberally regulated, or not regulated at all. 
So the lack of legal and administrative guarantees and restrictions open the 
  
 64 Throughout the world, in budget debates there is substantial disagreement about trying 
to define the medical boundaries of the “disabled group.” The issues can be as mundane as 
why the blind may receive a special state aid while others do not, or why specific social 
security preferences and benefits do not cover people with diabetes, or nephritis, etc. 
 65 For a discussion on whether infertility should be considered a “disability” for the 
purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, see Sato Sh.: A little bit 
disabled: Infertility and the Americans with Disabilities Act. New York University Journal 
of Legislative and Public Policy, Vol. 5 No 1. (2001–2002). 
 66 For a detailed analysis, see Eisgruber, Ch. L.: The Constitutional Value of 
Assimilation, 96 Columbia La Review (1996) 87. 
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possibilities for intentional misusage of measures, policies, or preferences 
intended for a specific group only. The question arises: what can the state do 
with the individual’s arbitrary, random, or even declared malevolent choice of 
identity when he or she is seeking preferential treatment? As a matter of law 
and legal remedies, even if one openly admits to a fraudulent cause for utilizing 
minority preferences (such as enrolling under minority quotas to educational 
institutions), there is no legal, political, or even moral basis for questioning 
such self-identity classification.  
 The second affiliation-dilemma that law enforcement and legislators need to 
face is the following phenomenon: notwithstanding constitutional and statutory 
languages on equal treatment and free choice of identity, it is always the 
discriminatory practice of the majority that actually provides for de facto usage 
of affiliation-definition. Thus when it comes to the maltreatment of members 
of various ethnic groups, no serious definitional or recognition difficulties arise 
for the discriminating party. Just as (despite the Census Office’s multiracial 
affiliation recognition) a racially profiling American policeman is untroubled 
by identifying minority drivers, a racist East European restaurant waiter has no 
qualms about spotting a Roma customer and denying service to her. When it 
comes to discrimination or ethnic hostility, it is always the daily practice of the 
majority that will define membership in the discrete and insular minority 
group.  
 As for practical solutions, the legislator has basically three options: a) 
adopting a formal, in a way exclusive, and to some extent inevitably rigid 
classification, usually accompanied by some form of registration; or b) accepting 
the liberal standpoint and leaving ethnic-affiliation selection to the inner, 
personal and moral decision of the individual; and c) independent of the above 
two, when it better serves the interest of the underprivileged, victimized group 
make all its best effort to refer to the perceived, external classification as a rule 
of thumb.  
 As mentioned above, underlying this project there are two key dilemmas. 
The first one regards the question of how ethnicity should be assessed, for 
example, if we were to advocate that the police start compiling ethnic statistics 
regarding their patrolling activities: should they make records about perceived 
or self-claimed identity? The second fundamental question relates to the 
question of which general data privacy policy serves better the interests of the 
underprivileged and discriminated minority. That is, whether or not we should 
encourage a braver and more sincere policy on ethnic data generation or, 
whether we should instead continue to handle ethnicity as a taboo and see our 
goal as giving publicity to the potential dangers of allowing law enforcement 
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agencies to collect any kind of ethno-racial data. Bearing in mind Justice Harry 
Blackmun’s separate opinion in the cornerstone American affirmative action 
case Bakke:67 „To get beyond racism, we must take account of race ... and ... to 
treat some persons equally, we must ... treat them differently”. 
 
 
  
 67 Regents of University of California v. Bakke, (438 US 265, 1978). 
